5 billion dollars a year

In brief. The FBI counts about 5 billion dollars a year in exposed losses on average from business email compromise, from October 2013 to December 2023 (Inkan.link calculation from the total the FBI published). These losses come from reports to the FBI, law enforcement and financial-institution filings. Deepfakes have become the weapon of choice, and traditional recommendations have reached their limit.
In September 2024 the FBI published the cumulative exposed losses for business email compromise, from October 2013 to December 2023. Spread over the period, that is about 5 billion dollars a year on average (Inkan.link calculation). These losses come from reports to the FBI, law enforcement and financial-institution filings.
The figure grows with the tools available. Deepfakes, the manipulations that produce convincing voice and video, have become the weapon of choice for this kind of attack. Picture a call from your chief executive: the voice, the intonation, the pacing, all of it right. They ask for an urgent transfer for a confidential operation.
Traditional recommendations have reached their limit
Agencies advise treating unusual requests with suspicion and verifying through another channel. Those practices remain useful and should be applied.
They rest, however, on an ability that does not exist. Faced with a well-made deepfake, no human, whatever their training and level of vigilance, tells it apart from the real thing. The documented incidents are therefore not human error in the usual sense: the person did what they had been taught to do.
Two recent cases
In 2024 the engineering group Arup lost 25 million dollars in Hong Kong. An employee joined a video call in which the other participants were deepfakes. He made the transfers on the instruction of whom he believed was his CFO, and understood only when he contacted head office.
At Ferrari, the attempt failed narrowly. The criminals mimicked the voice, the accent and the Sicilian expressions of the chief executive. An employee asked a question only the real executive could answer. The defence held on one individual’s reflex, not on a control.
Detectors do not close the gap
Deepfake detectors, meant to take over from the eye and the ear, hold up poorly in real conditions, particularly on voice. Their reliability depends on the corpus they were trained on, and attackers work constantly to get around them. We covered this in detail using the CSIRO evaluation of sixteen detectors.
Rebuilding validation around the requester
If the message can no longer be authenticated, the person remains. That is the shift Sealfie carries: a mobile application that requires no training, and that prompts the real requester on their own phone before a sensitive order is carried out. Validation then stops resting on a spoken exchange and on one person’s judgement.
Test your procedure
The 30-minute Challenge explains how hackers get around the human procedures that finance teams put in place, and where yours gives way. A written report is available on request, either way.
Procedure by procedure: CEO fraud, why your payment procedures no longer hold.